Abstract: We study the role of hard information in contractual and market settings in which the receiver can flexibly adjust allocations and transfers in response to the sender's disclosure. These settings include monopoly pricing, insurance contracting, and policy negotiations. Across these settings, the sender is worst off if she reveals her type completely because the receiver would then adjust the terms of trade to extract her surplus. Taking this feature as our central departure from the literature, we characterize the entire set of equilibrium payoffs in these disclosure games. We prove an equivalence result: a payoff profile can be approximated by an equilibrium of the disclosure game if and only if it can be achieved through information design. Thus, there exist equilibria in which the sender obtains approximately her commitment payoff.

Abstract: Standard procurement models assume that the buyer knows the quality of the good at the time of procurement; however, in many settings, the quality is learned only long after the transaction. We study procurement problems in which the buyer's valuation of the supplied good depends directly on its quality, which is unverifiable and unobservable to the buyer. For a broad class of procurement problems, we identify procurement mechanisms maximizing any weighted average of the buyer's expected payoff and social surplus. The optimal mechanism can be implemented via an auction that restricts sellers to submitting bids within specific intervals.

Abstract: This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare them with commitment outcomes in information design. We provide conditions for a commitment outcome to be an equilibrium outcome and identify environments in which the sender does not benefit from commitment power. Our findings offer insights into the interchangeability of verifiability and commitment in applied settings.

Abstract: We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full revelation, other equilibria are less well understood. We show that any equilibrium payoff can be obtained with a disclosure strategy corresponding to a partition with a laminar structure that allows pooling of nonadjacent states. In a sender-preferred equilibrium, such a structure balances inducing more sender-favorable actions with deterring deviations. Leveraging this insight, we identify conditions under which the sender does not benefit from commitment power. We then apply these results to study selling with quality disclosure and influencing voters.

Abstract: New products often involve uncertainty about product fit, while sellers may also be unsure about what alternatives buyers face. I study a seller of a new product who sets a price and provides product-fit information before the buyer decides whether to search for an outside option. The buyer knows the outside-option distribution; the seller knows only its mean and bounds and maximizes guaranteed profit across compatible distributions. Information provision has two roles: it can hedge against uncertainty about the outside-option distribution and deter search by making buying without search attractive. Price governs their relative value: a higher price raises revenue per sale but makes search deterrence harder. The results help explain why new products differ in product-fit information and show that lower search costs can raise prices and make information noisier, challenging the presumption that easier search necessarily benefits consumers.

Abstract: A principal hires an agent to acquire soft information about an unknown state. Even though neither how the agent learns nor what the agent discovers are contractible, we show the principal is unconstrained as to what information the agent can be induced to acquire and report honestly. When the agent is risk neutral, and a) is not asked to learn too much, b) can acquire information sufficiently cheaply, or c) can face sufficiently large penalties, the principal can attain the first-best outcome. We discuss the effect of risk aversion (on the part of the agent) and characterize the second-best contracts.

Abstract: We show that when expertise lies not in what one initially knows but in the ability to acquire information and thereby refine beliefs, prediction-based contracts can distinguish experts from non-experts.

Abstract: A sender flexibly acquires evidence—which she may pay a third party to certify—to disclose to a receiver. When evidence acquisition is overt, the receiver observes the evidence gathering process irrespective of whether its outcome is certified. When acquisition is covert, the receiver does not. In contrast to the case with exogenous evidence, the receiver prefers a strictly positive certification cost. As acquisition costs vanish, equilibria converge to the Pareto-worst free-learning equilibrium. The receiver always prefers covert to overt evidence acquisition.